Provoking Renamo

By Joseph Hanlon

Frelimo appears to be intentionally provoking Renamo, pushing it to boycott the elections or return to war.

Negotiations between the late Renamo president Afonso Dhlakama and President Filipe Nyusi were personal and on the telephone. Ultimately, they were based on the belief that the two sides would act in good faith and that there would be some real power and resource sharing. This assumed first that Renamo would win a couple of governorships in fair elections and then have the resources and patronage of Frelimo governors. And it assumed second that Renamo officers would be appointed to senior positions with real power in the military - and the good faith was that Renamo would really demobilise and that it would have enough power in the joint military to prevent attacks on Renamo and a return to hit  squads.

Historically both sides wanted the present system because it gives the winning party overwhelming power over resources and patronage. Frelimo believed that it could maintain its hold on power while Dhlakama always wanted to be president - and turned down two earlier power sharing deals. But Dhlakama's change in attitude from 2016 was real, with the understanding that decentralised electoral politics could provide a base for building the party. And Renamo's success in municipal elections shows that his thinking was correct.

Who becomes mayor?

Must mayor and assembly members be local?

The CM proposals suddenly raised the possibility that candidates on a party list need not be local, and this was challenged by parliament's 1st commission (Constitutional Affairs). It notes that the recently passed constitutional amendments say that the municipal assembly "is elected by citizens resident in the municipality," thus to register to vote a person must be resident locally. But the CM draft law simply says that a candidate must be registered. Could it be in another municipality?

The assumption is always that candidates must be registered locally, but the section (art 85) on who can vote in a polling station where they are not registered, questions this. The law includes the normal list who can vote at any polling station: polling stations staff, party agents, police, journalists, and observers. But the CM added  one more: "candidates for mayor who have registered in any municipality, even if they are not registered in this one." (art 85) This clearly implies candidates for mayor need not be from the same municipality. The AR rejected this, but it remains unclear if candidates this year must be local.

The CM draft to revise the basic municipal law (2/97) explicitly would allow three candidates for municipal assembly, including the head of the list, to come from other municipalities. (art 96-A) Based on their report on the electoral law, it seems highly likely that the AR 1st commission will hold that to be unconstitutional.

Comment: 

Joseph Hanlon
Parties versus prominent people

Most democracies face challenges over decentralisation - how much power is retrained by the national party, how much is devolved to local parties branches, and whether directly elected mayor gain too much personal power. Both Renamo and Frelimo saw this happen in 2008. For Frelimo, Eneas Comiche became too popular and was too honest for party barons, and was not allowed to stand for re-election as Maputo mayor in 2008. At the same time, Daviz Simango became too popular as mayor of Beira, and at the last minute Renamo head Afonso Dhlakama did not let him stand as Renamo candidate, but in a few days he was able to stand as an independent and was overwhelmingly elected - and set up a new party, the MDM.

Neither party was prepared to allow a mayor to gain that much personal power, thus the agreement to end direct election of mayors. The naming of the head of the list, and also the number two, are much more controlled by the parties, and it will be harder for a future Comiche or Daviz to escape the party barons and patronage systems.

Several Council of Ministers (CM) proposals which would further have strengthened national party power in the municipalities, by giving parties more power over how the major is replaced if they die or quit, requiring candidates to be party members, allowing parties to change the head of list, and allowing parties to bring in mayoral candidates from outside. However, parliament seems to support more local democracy, and has already rejected some of these.    Jh

Texts: The CM draft laws and AR commission opinions are posted  on:  http://cipmoz.org:9000/eleicoes2018/

In News reports & clippings, 27 July 2018

Ninguém é responsável?

Comentário  de Joseph Hanlon

De novo, em Nampula, houve atrasos na abertura de mesas de voto. De acordo com relatório de observação do Votar Moçambique, em pelo menos quatro escolas onde funcionaram postos de votação, não havia tinta indelével para eleitores mergulhar o dedo após votar de modo a evitar dupla votação. Em uma escola, faltavam cadernos eleitorais. Em uma outra escola foram boletins de voto usados na primeira volta.

O material é entregue nos postos de votação em kits que são organizados no STAE central antes do dia da votação. Se falta tinta indelével ou cadernos eleitorais no kit, significa que ninguém verificou os kits antes de seguirem para os postos. Ou alguém furtou tinta indelével?

Em todo o mundo há sistema de verificação antes da entrega das encomendas. Alguém inspeciona a encomenda para verificar se está tudo correcto e depois coloca na encomenda uma senha com o nome ou número de identificação do verificador.

No STAE, o sistema parece ser de que ninguém é responsável por nada. O STAE devia indicar verificadores dos kits que seriam os primeiros responsáveis em caso da falta de conteúdo nos kits. E os verificadores cujos kits não tenham nada em falta, seriam publicamente reconhecidos.. jh

Fonte: - Boletim Sobre o Processo Político em Moçambique 21 - 16 de Março de 2018

Police, army, SISE heads changed

By Joseph Hanlon

In a post-Congress reshuffle triggered by ill health and the need to prepare for the integration of Renamo forces, President Filipe Nyusi last week appointed new heads in the military, police and security services.

Lagos Lidimo steps down as director general of the State Intelligence and Security Service (SISE), while Graca Chongo retires as armed forces (FADM) Chief of Staff. Both are known to be seriously ill. And the deputy commander of the national police (PRM), Jose Weng San, died two weeks ago after a lengthy illness.

Lazaro Menete, formerly commander of the army, is promoted to be the new armed forces head, replacing Chongo. Prior to his army service, he was a rear admiral and navy commander. The armed forces deputy chief of staff Raul Dique was named by Nyusi last year, and is one of the senior officers who came from Renamo after the 1992 peace accord. Menete is replaced as army commander by Ezequiel Muianga, former chief of staff of the Presidential Guard.

Was secret loan money used to import sanctions-busting North Korea arms? – Hanlon

Mozambique ordered missiles and communications equipment from North Korea as well as refurbishment of Soviet era military equipment in violation of United Nations sanctions, according to Security Council expert panel reports published 27 February and 5 September. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/742

“Mozambique has yet to provide a substantive reply to the Panel’s enquiries,” the 5 September report says; requests have been made for more than a year. On 12 September Council of Ministers spokesperson, Deputy Culture Minister Ana Comoana, pledged full cooperation with the UN panel, and said the government would provide “due clarification at the opportune moment”.

The little noticed 27 February report lists a $6 million contract dated 28 November 2013 between the North Korean Haegeumgang Trading Corporation and Monte Binga, which is owned by the Mozambican Defence Ministry. ProIndicus, one of the three companies which took out the $2 bn secret loans, is half owned by Monte Binga and half by the security services, SISE.

According to the expert panel, under the contract Haegeumgang was to upgrade and refurbish Soviet era equipment: P-18 early warning radar, AT-3 anti-tank missiles, T-55 tanks, and truck-mounted surface-to-air Pechora missile systems. It was also to supply “man-portable air defence system components and training equipment”, 250 kg “glide induced bombs”, radar systems, communications and electronics detection equipment, and a “chemical warfare monitoring command car” and related equipment. And it was to rehabilitate a gunpowder processing factory.

The secret $622 mn loans to ProIndicus were arranged by Credit Suisse and VTB in February and June 2013 and thus it seems likely that that some of the loan was used for the November 2013 contract to purchase the North Korean weaponry. The three Mozambican companies which took the $2 bn secret loans are controlled by the security services SISE, which refused to provide any information on how most of the money was used. Now, both the IMF and the Security Council are demanding information.

UN Security Council resolution 1874 in June 2009 banned countries from importing any arms or related material from North Korea. AIM (13 Sep) notes that North Korea no longer has an embassy in Mozambique.

In Club of Mozambique – 18.09.2017

Thumbs down from IMF

By Joseph Hanlon

The IMF mission which left Mozambique yesterday rejected what it had been offered by the government. The Kroll report on secret debt with its lack of “critical information” is again rejected. And the IMF made harsh demands for tax rises, spending cuts, no new investment and action on state companies. The IMF statement pointedly said “this mission will not result in a Board discussion,” which means no new IMF programme this year and no resumption of aid which has been cut off.

The 10-19 July mission was headed, as have recent missions, by Michel Lazare, who repeated and strengthened his past demands. He explicitly cited the 24 June press statement on the Kroll report, saying that “critical information gaps remain unaddressed regarding the use of loans proceeds.” The government must “take steps to fill the information gaps and to enhance its action plan to strengthen transparency, improve governance, and ensure accountability.”

Clearly annoyed that the government had not listened to past statements, Lazare said “the 2018 budget should decisively reduce the fiscal deficit.” The government “should focus on:

+ eliminating tax exemptions (including for VAT),

+ containing the expansion of the wage bill, and

+ prioritizing the implementation of only the most critical public investments, while avoiding the further accumulation of arrears.”

“Urgent action is also needed to strengthen the financial position of loss-making companies and limit the fiscal risks they represent.”

Lazare always stresses wage cuts and attacks state companies. But this package contains new austerity measures, including tax rises and a sharp cut in public investment, which is in part pointed at announcements of non-essential projects such as Xai-Xai airport.

Three new phrases are also important. “Reduce the fiscal deficit” means government cannot continue to spend above its income, in part through domestic borrowing. And “avoiding the further accumulation of arrears” points to the way that the government has been surviving simply by not paying its bills, and seems unable to even provide an accounting of how much it owes. Similarly “fiscal risks” refers to the huge debts of some state companies, which also remain unclear.

The demands for further austerity were expressed in normal IMF jargon: “Macroeconomic policy discussions centered on the urgent need to further consolidate public finances. The team emphasized that a strong commitment to fiscal adjustment is an essential element to ensure policy sustainability, foster a decline in inflation and interest rates, limit further increases in public debt, while at the same time facilitate debt restructuring.” Unpacking this, the phrases “consolidate public finances” and “fiscal adjustment” mean spend less. “Limit further increases in public debt” means the government cannot continue with the rapid expansion of local, domestic borrowing.

But he adds that “protecting critical social programs and reinforcing the social safety net should cushion the impact of these measures on the most vulnerable segments of the population.”

Meanwhile, Lazare stresses that Mozambique’s overall economic outlook “remains challenging” and that any increase in growth this year will be entirely due to an increase in the export price of coal. Virtually the only praise in the statement was that “the government took important steps by removing wheat and fuel subsidies and reinstating the old automatic fuel price mechanism in March.”

Also Read: Breaking: IMF Press Release on the visit to Mozambique – Unabridged

Comment: As well as the normal IMF austerity prescription, Michel Lazare is using his knowledge of Mozambique to go after the rent-seeking and patronage aspects of the Mozambican elite. State companies such as the airline LAM have long provided jobs, contracts and other benefits for the Frelimo elite; extra posts in ministries and provincial administration are for party cadres and push up the wage bill; contracts for supplies and projects provide important revenues. Opposition parties remain quiet about this because they hope to benefit in the next elections by winning posts that would give them power over such spending. This was underlined by the purchase of 18 Mercedes Benz cars for $3.8 million for members of the parliamentary Standing Commission, initially agreed by members of all three parties and only after public outcry rejected by the opposition parties, but again last week defended by the speaker of parliament, Veronica Macamo. “Members of the Standing Commission are above the level of ministers. Therefore, in legal and procedural terms, we do not see any problem,” she said. (AIM En 12 July)

Also Read: Watch: Verónica Macamo speaks out on Mercedes for MPs

This presents a serious problem for President Filipe Nyusi at the Frelimo Congress in September. The $2 bn secret debt is widely believed to have benefitted some senior Frelimo people, and at lower levels the party has become dependent on patronage, jobs and other benefits paid by the government. The Frelimo leadership has pretended that the delays in the gas projects and the end to budget support and IMF programme would not halt the gravy train because it could borrow domestically and delay paying its bills. Lazare says explicitly this cannot continue. Will the Congress allow at least a few secret debt scapegoats to be identified and accept some belt tightening? Or will it block its ears and continue to pretend that Mozambique can have Mercedes at the top and hand money down the patronage chain?

Japan has suspended new lending because of the secret debt, Japanese Agency for International Cooperation (JICA) representative Yamashita Chigiru told O Pais (20 July). He added “we cannot just suspend loans: we have to create conditions so that the [debt] problem does not repeat itself. It does not make sense for Mozambique to make the same mistake again, given the impact on its population.”

Also Read: “At the moment, it is not appropriate to lend to Mozambique”

Interest payments were not made on 18 July on the government bonds which replaced the Ematum bonds, the Ministry of Economy and Finance announced on 17 July. Last year, the government nationalised the private loan to Ematum and replaced it with a $726,524,000 10.5% government bond to be repaid in 2023, with interest paid twice a year. The statement said: “As mentioned by H.E. the Minister of Economy and Finance, during the investor presentation in London on 25 October 2016, and as reiterated in the Ministry’s communiques dated 14 November 2016 and 16 January 2017, the challenging macroeconomic and fiscal situation of the Republic has severely affected the country’s public finances. The resulting debt payment capacity of the Republic remains extremely limited in 2017, and does not allow the Republic room to make the scheduled interest payment on the Notes. The Government is committed to finding a consensual and collaborative resolution to the current financial crisis through dialogue with the holders of its direct and guaranteed external commercial obligations. It will be critical that any solution is based upon a realistic appraisal of the Republic’s capacity to pay.”

By Joseph Hanlon

Source: News Reports & Clippings, 20.07.2017

Cleaning up after Guebuza

By Joseph Hanlon

The presidency of Armando Guebuza has left a host of problems in government and the civil service. The $2 bn secret debt is tip of an iceberg of corruption and sense of entitlement at all levels. US legal actions revealed bribes paid to senior people in LAM and the airports authority. Demands for money by the traffic police, at airports, and for services have become endemic. There is a long list of dubious government contracts issued outside the normal public tender system, which often mean poorer services for ordinary Mozambicans.

One of the problems has been the entrenchment of patronage. Jobs are dependent on Frelimo party member and/or family or social links. There is a sense of entitlement - to perks, extra money, a car, etc. Priority becomes serving the patron - doing party work rather than doing a good job. At the same time there are no rewards for taking risks or doing the job well; indeed the good and honest people are often marginalised because they show up the others. Taken together it has led to a sharp deterioration in state services. LAM has four of seven airplanes grounded, a result partly of difficulty maintaining a fleet of too many kinds of aircraft, resulting from bribes, and flights are cancelled arbitrarily and no revised schedule is announced. Maputo has water shortages now because no one was brave enough to announce water rationing a year ago or push for new wells and pipelines two years ago. There are electricity cuts because EDM does not maintain or replace its aging equipment or keep enough spares. MCel crumbles because there is no pressure to keep up with the competition and changing technology. The IMF and donors are now demanding privatization of the remaining state companies, which would surely be supported by the disgruntled customers.

Debate sobre a dívida oculta moçambicana no YouTube, amanhã dia 25, pelas 15 horas de Maputo

O debate sobre a dívida oculta está quente. E na sequência do recente incumprimento do Governo e da ameaça dos credores de exigirem uma indemnização pelo default, a coisa promete aquecer mais. Aliás, um consultor dos credores,Charles Blitzer, a propósito do default por Moçambique, disse à Bloomberg: o incumprimento “não foi motivado pela incapacidade de fazer o pagamento"; "esta estratégia não conduz a avanços” e “não leva a restaurar a confiança de futuros financiadores e investidores".

Depois de um despique entre Joseph Hanlon e Roberto Julio Tibana aqui neste espaço, o debate é agora levado para o YouTube por iniciativa da publicação ZITAMAR, em colaboração com o Africa Research Institute. Em directo (live stream), através do seguinte link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h62LLithnV4

A discussão vai colocar frente à frente as seguintes figuras:

Marco Ruijer, Lead Portfolio Manager, Emerging Markets Debt Hard Currency, at NN Investment Partners, The Netherlands

• Dr Roberto Tibana, Principal Consultant at Analitica-RJT, Maputo, Mozambique

• Anne Frühauf, Senior Vice President with Teneo Intelligence, Bogota, Colombia

• Dr Joseph Hanlon, Visiting Senior Fellow at the London School of Economics and at the Open University, based in London

E será moderado pelo editor do Zitamar, Tom Bowker. O acesso é gratuíto.

Roberto Tibana Versus Joseph Hanlon: achegas sobre a dívida oculta

Por Marcelo Mosse

O artigo “Sacrificar Chang, sem puni-lo”, publicado aqui ontem suscitou outros debates noutros lugares. Circulado também por email numa lista restrita, ele provocou a reacção do reputado economista Roberto Tibana, que se opõe veementemente à perspectiva de Hanlon, segundo a qual o Governo podia renunciar ao pagamento dos 2 bilhões de USD, condenar um ou dois culpados (por exemplo, o ex-ministro Chang) mas evitar que sejam punidos com prisão. Hanlon voltou a prescrever a mesma saída, explicando sucintamente as suas razoes.

A seguir, os textos de Roberto Julio Tibana e Joseph Hanlon, enviados por email. Os dois consentiram a sua publicação aqui.

ROBERTO TIBANA REAGE À PROPOSTA DE JOE HANLON

Marcelo Mosse

A comparação do Joe Hanlon (que você menciona no seu artigo) está fora de contexto. Em Moçambique são $2 biliões contra $18 biliões de PIB, num dos países mais pobres do mundo onde dezenas de milhares de crianças se sentam no chão para aprender e quando chove não há aulas, e onde não há um único hospital ou centro de saúde que não se queixa de falta de meios básicos. Na França são +/- $400 Milhões contra quantas dezenas de biliões de USD de PIB?

Aqui foi para comprar armas e iniciar uma guerra criminosa, incluindo comissões para a família do chefão da época. Na França não se fala de Lagarde envolvida em negócios de armas. Aqui foi uma cabala que subverteu de uma maneira perigosa os serviços de inteligência. Na Franca, a segurança nacional não está posta em causa. Aqui se violou a Constituição para se fazer isto tudo. Na França não se violou Constituição. Aqui as pessoas que fizeram isso dizem que fariam o mesmo. A Sra. Lagarde não é conhecida por fazer nenhuma afirmação semelhante.

The house of cards has collapsed

By Joseph Hanlon

Last week saw the final collapse of a house of cards built from greed and hubris. Mozambique admitted it cannot pay its debts; last week it was announced poverty and inequality increased; and it was accepted that inflation will hit 30% and devaluation will exceed 100%. The United States announced that LAM has accepted bribes from Brazil. And then the mediators went home in frustration as an unwinnable war continues, with Renamo demanding the impossible and Frelimo refusing to make essential concessions.

The results of the poverty survey announced last week showed that while in 2003, 55% of the rural population was below the poverty line, it had only been reduced to 50% last year. Two decades of lack of development mean that half the rural population is still below the poverty line. And President Nyusi, speaking in Mopeia, admitted that "very little" had been done to support agriculture - confirming what Joao Mosca and others have been saying for more than a decade.

Few people come out of this looking good. Over the past five years, how could so many people inside and outside of government turn a blind eye to corrupt, excessive, prestige projects? Why did it take the United States to announce last week that LAM has accepted bribes? How could the IMF not notice the exorbitant debt? Or was there too much joint interest in encouraging foreign companies to gain a share of the gas money? Inside Frelimo, was the money spread around so widely that no one objected? With brave journalists and campaigners being threatened and attacked, were people too afraid to speak out?

News reports & clippings

Renamo negotiator assassinated

Senior Renamo figure Jeremias Pondeca was gunned down in Maputo Saturday (8 October). He was a member of the joint commission negotiating a settlement between Renamo and government. He was a member of the Council of State, an advisory body to the President of the Republic, and had been a member of parliament 1995-2004.

Pondeca had two businesses in the new fish market on the Marginal and he normally opened the businesses and then took a run along the Marginal. He was running past the Game store at 07.00 when he was shot seven times by four men. (AIM En 9 Oct; Noticias & O Pais 10 Oct) So far there has been no statement from President Nyusi.

Renamo-government talks were set to resume this afternoon (10 October), having been suspended since 30 September. Talks had been suspended by the mediators for two reasons. First was to allow the two sides to consult privately to try to find some way to break the negotiating log-jam. Second was two interventions by the mediators, and especially defacto chief mediator Mario Raffaelli. In a very formalistic way, Renamo-Frelimo negotiations have always rigidly followed an agreed agenda, dealing with only one point at a time. The second point on the agenda is decentralization and Renamo’s demand to appoint six governors. Raffaelli tabled a paper on 27 September setting out how Renamo’s demands could be met without amending the constitution, and unexpectedly the next day the government asked more time to consider the paper, suggesting they were taking it seriously. Raffaelli also gained agreement to move on to the third item on the agenda, integration of Renamo forces into the police and military, before the second point was resolved.

What deal with the IMF?

By Joseph Hanlon

Donors stopped budget support and the IMF cut off its loan when the $2.2 bn in secret debt was revealed earlier this year. Budget support donors have left it for the IMF to negotiate a new agreement, so that deal will be at the top of Zandamela’s list - and his appointment itself is probably the first step in that negotiation.

Donors and the IMF have been calling for an international and independent forensic audit, which would identify over-pricing and commissions, and would be expected to point fingers at those who benefitted in the Armando Guebuza government. Government has resisted. When President Filipe Nyusi swore in Zandamela Thursday, he said pointedly: “do not be surprised nor alarmed by what may be pressure from outside. Mozambique is your land and it is for her that you should make your best efforts.” (Lusa 1 Sep) That seems a warning not to accept a forensic audit. Is that possible? The IMF has been taking a hard line, and departing IMF representative Alex Segura continued to demand a forensic audit. (Savana 2 Sep) The new resident representative is Brazilian Ari Aisen, who has been a senior economist at the IMF in Washington.

Will heads roll

By Joseph Hanlon

In China, a few corrupt officials are made examples and executed. In Mozambique, some donors want at least metaphoric heads to role. But Frelimo's history suggests otherwise.

Perhaps the best model of what will happen is an old story. As a condition of IMF support, the then People’s Development Bank (BPD) was privatised in 1997 to the Southern Bank Berhad (SBB) of Malaysia (30%) and Invester (30%), a Mozambican company headed by Octavio Muthemba, former Industry Minister and chair of SPI - Gestão e Investimentos, the Frelimo party holding company. The state kept 40% of the renamed Banco Austral. Through a mix of direct theft and bad loans to themselves and others in the Frelimo elite, the bank was drained of at least $150 million and then handed back to the state in 2001. Antonio Siba-Siba Macuacua, the Bank of Mozambique’s head of banking supervision, was named head and tried to collect on some of the loans and prepare the bank for reprivatisation to ABSA of South Africa (later Barclays). In an unsuccessful attempt to stop the sale, Siba-Siba was murdered at the bank’s offices on 11 August 2001.

Desorganização propositada?

Por Joseph Hanlon

Prevê-se que a maioria dos funcionários votaram nestas eleições. E muitos funcionários públicos são leais a Frelimo têm razões para tal - por exemplo, eles pensam que foi a independência que permitiu que tivessem acesso à uma boa educação, e têm visto uma expansão dos serviços de saúde e educação que creditam dever-se a Frelimo. Alguns vão um pouco mais longe apoiando o partido e dando preferência aos membros do partido nos postosde trabalho ou atribuição de financiamentos, como é o caso dos "7 milhões".

Lancamento do Livro "Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento"

Autores: Teresa Smart e Joseph Hanlon 

Data: 30 de Julho (4ª Feira)

Horario: 17h30

Local: Museu de Historia Natural, Maputo

Data: 14 de agosto (5ª Feira)

Horario: 15h00

Local: UniLurio, Nampula

Mocambique importa alimentos e ao mesmo tempo aqueles que os produzem continuam pobres porque a producao agricola e muito baixa. A maioria das pessoas continua a cultivar a terra como faziam os seus avos. Mas desde o fim da guerra, ha duas decadas, tem surgido um novo grupo de agricultores mais dinâmicos. Hoje contam-se ja 68 000 pequenos e medios agricultores comerciais. Tal como os seus vizinhos, antigamente tinham apenas 1 hectare de terra e usavam a enxada como utensilio. Hoje cultivam entre 3 e 20 hectares e produzem principalmente para comercializar. Criaram emprego a nivel da sua comunidade e estimulam a economia local.

Investigador lança livro "Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento" da agricultura em Moçambique

O investigador britânico da Chatham House Joseph Hanlon lança este mês um livro intitulado "Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento" da agricultura em Moçambique, em que aborda a necessidade de apoio aos produtores comerciais de pequena escala.

It would have been cheaper to pay Renamo

Joseph Hanlon

Recruiting 3000 extra people nominated by parties to the electoral machine will cost $35 million, Budget Director Rogerio Nkomo told the STV television programme “O Pais Economico”. (O Pais 24 March)  Renamo's main interest has also been to be able to give jobs to its members, and its leaders have made clear they want some of the gas and coal money. If a year ago the government had offered $35 million to Renamo, it would probably have led to negotiations and Afonso Dhlakama and his generals might have settled for $100 million. That would have been cheap. The mini-war and subsequent settlement will surely end up costing more than that.  Jh

Source: MOZAMBIQUE 247
News  reports & clippings
26 March 2014

Apresentação do candidato da Frelimo é uma violação da lei e da constituição

Por Joseph Hanlon

Ao introduzir o candidato da Frelimo à presidência e não os dos outros partidos em um comicio popular como parte da Presidência Aberta, o Presidente Armando Guebuza violou a Constituição, bem como a recente Lei da Probidade Pública (Lei 16/2012) e a mais antiga Lei 4/1990, que continua em vigor, de acordo com pareceres jurídicos recebidos por este boletim.

Na semana passada, o Presidente Armando Guebuza apresentou o candidato da Frelimo, Filipe Nyusi como a pessoa que irá substituí-lo como chefe de Estado. Isso desencadeou uma onda de críticas. Ele foi forçado a defender-se na quinta-feira, em uma conferência de imprensa em Maua, Niassa, para dizer que ele estava apenas exercendo seu próprio direito à "liberdade de expressão" e não fazer campanha política.

Comentário de Joseph Hanlon Cruzando a linha

Em todas as eleições, o partido no poder tem uma vantagem. Por exemplo, é a época chuvosa que determina o início da campanha agrícola, mas coincidindo com a campanha eleitoral, confere aos líderes da Frelimo publicidade extra e útil.

A Lei Eleitoral revista ano passado, foi elaborada de forma que tente manter o equilíbrio, mas de duas maneiras o partido governamental parece ter cruzado a linha para a injustiça e desequilíbrio.

Boletim sobre o processo político em Moçambique

Leia o Boletim sobre o processo político em Moçambique Número 51 – 17 de Setembro de 2012 aqui com os seguintes temas:

Participantes melhoram jogo nas eleições municipais

Resultados de quatro eleições intercalares

O papel fundamental dos delegados de candidatura

Observadores e jornalistas mantiveram-se por perto

Forte presença policial

A Frelimo abusa do seu poder predominante?

CC ataca 'impunidade'

Desconhecendo a lei

Baixo número de votos nulos e em branco

As cidades na mira da oposição

Opinião: Acabe-se com o sigilo na CNE